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JONES V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES:
A DANGEROUS EXPANSION OF EIGHTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS STIFLES
EFFORTS TO CLEAN UP SKID ROW
Emily N. McMorris*
I. INTRODUCTION
Los Angeles County houses a homeless population in excess of
80,000 individuals.' Many of these individuals reside on the streets
of the City of Los Angeles in an area known as "Skid Row."2 Skid
Row covers approximately fifty blocks immediately east of
downtown Los Angeles The area houses the greatest concentration
of homeless people in the western United States and is the site of
twenty percent of all narcotics arrests within the City.4
In April 2006, a panel of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Jones v. City of Los Angeles,5 ruled that the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from "Cruel and Unusual Punishment
' 6
prohibited the enforcement of a Los Angeles ordinance ("Ordi-
nance") aimed at arresting people for sitting or sleeping on city
streets, sidewalks, or alleys.7 The court held that as long as Los
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Economics, 2003,
University of California, San Diego. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work and dedication, Monica Mendes for her invaluable
feedback and advice and Professor Allan Ides for making the publication of this comment
possible. To my family and Alexis Tello, thank you for your endless love and support.
1. See Jan Perry, ACLU's Victory is a Loss for Skid Row, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2006, at
Bl 1.
2. See Richard Winton, Plan Would End Homeless 'Tent Cities,' L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19,
2006, at Al.
3. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006).
4. Winton, supra note 2.
5. 444F.3d 1118.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. ViII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
7. See L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.18(d) (2005).
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Angeles's homeless population exceeds the number of shelter beds
available in the city, the ordinance cannot be enforced during
sleeping hours.8
Our country faces a homelessness epidemic which is only
getting worse. Thus, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
and the city of Los Angeles should be battling to end homelessness,
rather than battling each other over an unfortunate decision which
perpetuates homelessness and significantly hinders the Los Angeles
police force's efforts to clean up Skid Row. 9
This comment will explore the landmark cases dealing with
conduct derivative of status and its application to Eighth Amendment
protections. Through detailed analysis, the comment deconstructs
the Jones majority's misinterpretation and exceedingly broad reading
of these cases in justifying its decision. Finally, the conclusion
explores the already present negative ramifications of the court's
decision and the inevitable injustices bound to occur due to the
court's expansive reading of Eighth Amendment protections. This
comment approves of the message sent by the court that being
homeless is not a crime, but does not condone the court's
dangerously expansive decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The ACLU brought suit on behalf of six homeless individuals,
all of whom were arrested or cited for violating the Los Angeles
Ordinance designed to aid the City in cleaning up Skid Row.' The
Ordinance provides that "[n]o person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon
any street, sidewalk or other public way."" The Ordinance,
however, does not apply to "persons sitting on the curb portion of
any sidewalk or street while attending or viewing" a permitted
parade. 2 The six individuals who brought suit were Edward Jones,
Stanley Barger, Patricia Vinson, George Vinson, Thomas Cash, and
8. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138.
9. See Richard Winton & Cara DiMassa, No Skid Row Accord for City, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
22, 2006, at B3 ("Before the court decision, police used the ordinance mostly during the day,
allowing people to sleep in tents or on the streets at night as long as they were packed up by
morning. But since the ruling, officers are not enforcing the ordinance at any hour.").
10. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1120.
11. L.A., CAL., MuN. CODE § 41.18(d).
12. Id.
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Robert Lee Purrie ("Appellants").' 3 They argued that shelters are not
always an option for them for numerous reasons, such as persons
missing the bus to the shelter, shelters not being able to house
spouses together, and certain shelters being full. 4 Appellants live on
the streets of Los Angeles' Skid Row district.15 Each of the six
Appellants were deemed to have violated the Ordinance for sleeping
on the streets of Skid Row, some during daytime hours and others
during the night. 6 Defendants are the city of Los Angeles, Los
Angeles Police Department Chief, William Bratton, and Captain
Charles Beck ("Appellees").' 7
The homeless individuals sought injunctive relief against
enforcement of the Ordinance during sleeping hours, between 9:00
p.m. and 6:30 a.m., ' and the parties filed a cross motion for
summary judgment. 9 The U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California granted summary judgment for the City.2" Appellants
appealed and the Ninth Circuit reversed the award of summary
judgment to the city of Los Angeles, granted summary judgment to
the ACLU, and remanded the case to district court.2'
III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The majority's decision relies heavily upon two landmark
Eighth Amendment decisions, Robinson v. California22 and Powell v.
Texas,23 to reach its determination that Appellants' conduct was an
unavoidable consequence of their status as homeless individuals,
24
which is constitutionally protected under the Eighth Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit places substantial reliance on these cases in
justifying its controversial decision. Nevertheless, it must be noted
13. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1120.
14. See Appellees' Brief at 1, Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006)
(No. 04-55324).
15. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1120.
16. See id. at 1124-25.
17. Id. at 1120.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1125.
20. Appellees' Brief, supra note 14, at 1.
21. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138.
22. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
23. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
24. SeeJones, 444F.3dat 1136, 1138.
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that the court's reliance on these cases is misplaced. The Jones court
misinterprets Robinson and does not conduct a critical or detailed
analysis of the multiple opinions within Powell. The court thus
arrives at an unsupported decision.
When analyzing the Eighth Amendment, courts consider the
"Robinson Test."25 In Robinson, a police officer arrested a man for
being a drug user after the officer saw what he believed to be track
marks on the man's arm.26 The arrest and conviction were based on a
California statute making it a criminal offense to be "addicted to the
use of narcotics."27  The Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
holding that a law criminalizing a person's status as a narcotics
addict is an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.28 The court's determination that drug
addiction is a "status" was drawn from the idea that it is "unlikely
that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it a
criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be
afflicted with a venereal disease."29 Robinson set the precedent that
one cannot be criminalized for his mental state without an
accompanying act. Thus, the case does not deal with criminalizing
conduct or conduct derivative of status.3 °
Six years later, the justices in Powell diverged regarding
whether certain conduct derivative of one's status was in fact
voluntary. A four justice plurality, headed by Justice Marshall, held
that a Texas statute3' which made it illegal to be drunk in a public
place did not violate the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.32  They reasoned that Powell, who was arrested
and charged with being found drunk in public, was not being
punished for his "status" or "condition" of being a chronic
25. Municipalities Should Reconsider Anti-Homeless Ordinances, 26 MUN. LITIG. REP. 166
(2006) (reviewing Justin Cook, Down and Out in San Antonio: The Constitutionality of San
Antonio's Anti-Homeless Ordinances, 9 SCHOLAR 221 (2006)).
26. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661-62.
27. Id. at 660 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (repealed 1972)).
28. See id. at 666 (citing Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)).
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 477 (Vernon 1952) ("Whoever shall get drunk or be found in
a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his own, shall be fined
not exceeding one hundred dollars.").
32. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 516, 531-37 (1968) (Marshall, J., plurality).
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alcoholic.3 Rather, he was punished for the conduct of being found
drunk in a public place.34 The four dissenting justices in Powell
interpreted Robinson to stand for the notion that an individual cannot
be penalized for a condition that he or she is incapable of changing,35
and thus a person who commits some involuntary act or
"compulsion" due to their condition or disease cannot be punished
for such an act.36
Justice White's swing-vote concurrence provided the crucial
vote to the divided panel, a vote which upheld Powell's conviction.
While White expressed his view that one should not be punished for
yielding to a compulsion which stems from a disease,37 he obviously
did not feel comfortable joining the broad and unqualified opinion of
the dissenters concerning what is required to deem conduct
involuntary. White stressed that a chronic alcoholic who is able to
prove his disease can be convicted for being drunk in public, unless
he can affirmatively prove both an involuntary compulsion to drink
and that it is impossible for him to stay out of public places while
drunk.38 White's opinion set a strict standard for classifying conduct
as involuntary. White did not feel that Powell had proven that he
was in such a state of intoxication as to have lost the ability to
understand what he was doing, nor did White feel it had been proven
impossible for Powell to stay off the street that night.39
Distinguishing himself from the dissenters, White suggested that
some conduct resulting from a disease may be immune from
criminalization, but he would not deem Powell's conduct
involuntary," even though medical testimony suggested otherwise.4"
Due to the sharp divide amongst the Justices, White's opinion had
33. See id. at 532-534.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 566 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
36. See id. at 569-70.
37. Id. at 548-50 (White, J., concurring).
38. See id. at 550.
39. Id. at 553-54.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 518 (Marshall, J., plurality). Dr. David Wade, a Fellow of the American
Medical Association, testified that he examined Powell and would classify him as a "chronic
alcoholic," who when intoxicated was not able to control his behavior. Id. Dr. Wade also noted
that Powell reached this level of intoxication because his compulsion to drink was uncontrollable.
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the effect of deciding the case, as he agreed with the plurality that the
defendant's conduct was voluntary.42
Robinson and Powell are distinguishable from one another in
that the former dealt with punishing mere status while the latter dealt
with punishing conduct derivative of status. In criminalizing conduct
derivative of status, the Powell plurality recognized the importance
of placing limits on "public behavior which may create substantial
health and safety hazards, both for appellant and for members of the
general public. 43
The Powell plurality also made the point that
[t]he primary purpose of . . . [the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment] clause has always been considered, and
properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of
punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes;
the nature of the conduct made criminal is ordinarily
relevant only to the fitness of the punishment imposed."
Even though a later case, Ingraham v. Wright,45 stated that one of the
three effects of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that it
"imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and
punished as such," the plurality stressed that this limitation is to be
used "sparingly. 
46
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Jones court dealt with the issue of whether the Eighth
Amendment prohibits enforcement of the Ordinance as applied to
homeless individuals "involuntarily sitting, lying, or sleeping on the
street. '47 The court justified its decision based on the decisions in
Robinson and Powell.
48
42. See id. at 553-54 (White, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 532 (Marshall, J., plurality).
44. Id. at 531-32 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
45. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
46. Id. at 667.
47. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 2006).
48. See id. at 1138.
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The court interpreted Robinson to support the idea that a "state
cannot punish a person for certain conditions" arising from one's
own conduct, or for acts one is unable to avoid.49
The Jones court relied on the dissent and Justice White's
concurrence in Powell to justify its holding. The court claimed that
these separate opinions both suggest that the "Eighth Amendment
prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it
is the an unavoidable consequence of one's status or being."5
The court read these two cases together to suggest that the
involuntariness of the act or condition being criminalized is essential
in "delineating a constitutionally cognizable status."'" Based on
these two cases, the court held that the Ordinance encroached upon
the Appellant's Eighth Amendment protection that "imposes
substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as
such."52
The court held that under Robinson, one could not be
criminalized for one's status, and that under Powell, one could not be
criminalized for certain involuntary conduct. 3 The court stated that
the conduct of the Appellants was involuntary and inseparable from
their status. It reasoned that because biologically, people must rest, 4
and that for these people, sleeping on the streets was an unavoidable
consequence of being homeless and without shelter in Los Angeles."
The court deemed the Appellants to be in a "chronic state that may
have been acquired 'innocently or involuntarily."' 56 Based on these
conclusions, the court found the Appellants had shown that they
were not able to stay off the streets, and, therefore, enforcement of
the Ordinance at night was cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. 7 The court stated that as long as the
number of homeless individuals in Los Angeles exceeds the number
49. See id. at 1133 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962)).
50. See id. at 1135 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 548, 550 n.2, 551 (1968) (White, J.,
concurring); Powell, 392 U.S. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting)).
51. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1132.
52. Id. at 1127.
53. Seeid. at 1133-35.
54. Id. at 1136.
55. Id. at 1138.
56. Id. at 1136 (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)).
57. See id.
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of shelter beds in the City, the Ordinance shall not be enforced
during sleeping hours. 8
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Powell Dissent Should Be Limited to Its Facts
The Jones majority did not conduct a thorough analysis of all
the Powell opinions. The court thus reached a holding that is
overbroad and does not directly follow from a close reading of
White's determinative and narrow concurrence. The majority
rationalized its disregard of the plurality opinion by noting that
Justice White and the plurality did not agree on the meaning of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. The court thus limited the
plurality opinion to its specific facts.59 The court erred in failing to
acknowledge that Justice White urged a stricter approach concerning
involuntary conduct than that of the dissenters.6" Hence, the Jones
court should have also limited the breadth of the dissent to its
specific facts and placed a greater emphasis on the standards set forth
by Justice White.
B. Because the Requirements Set Forth by
Justice White in Powell Were Not Satisfied
in Jones, the Court Incorrectly Relied on His Opinion
On an analytical level, the stringent requirements advocated by
Justice White were not satisfied by the circumstances presented in
the Jones case. The Jones court concluded that the Appellants had
no choice but to sleep on the streets. The court, however, did not
refer or provide citation to the record to substantiate its conclusion.61
Rather, there was no indication that shelter was unavailable on the
nights that the Appellants were cited for violating the Ordinance.62
In fact, evidence suggested that the Appellants, each in their own
way, made an affirmative choice not to take advantage of Los
Angeles shelters on the nights in question.63 As in Powell, the
58. Id. at 1138.
59. Id. at 1135.
60. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
61. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1124-25, 1137.
62. Id. at 1139-40 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
63. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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Appellants in Jones did not make an affirmative showing that it was
impossible for them to stay off the streets on these specific nights.'M
Thus, the Appellants did not satisfy Justice White's standards for
deeming conduct involuntary. The majority in Jones incorrectly
fused the broader dissent with White's noticeably stricter opinion
and, consequently, reached a conclusion that is not justified by the
precedent set by Powell.
C. Powell's View of Involuntariness Is Limited
to Situations Involving Disease and Addiction
In addition, the Jones majority adopted a sweeping view of
involuntariness that exceeds the limits advocated by the Powell
plurality, dissent, and White's concurrence. The plurality expressly
stated that the Appellant was not convicted due to his status as a
chronic alcoholic, but rather for his conduct of being drunk in public.
The plurality deemed the Appellant's conduct voluntary, which does
not trigger an application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause under Robinson.65 Thus, the Jones decision not only exceeds
but directly rejects the plurality's interpretation of involuntariness.
The Jones court goes astray in its expansion of the Powell
opinions on which it relies-namely the dissent and White's
concurrence. These Powell justices, who advocate that certain
conduct may not be criminalized, all seem to indicate that their
considerations of voluntariness are limited to the realm of diseases
and addictions, which create compulsive behaviors.66 The dissenters
focused on alcoholism as a disease, stressing that it depends on the
"physiological or psychological make-up and history" of a person
and is something he has no control over, in order to support their
argument that Powell's conduct was involuntary.67
64. Id.
65. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (Marshall, J., plurality).
66. Justice White, in his concurrence, discusses the use of narcotics and indicates that it can
not be a crime to "yield to . . . a compulsion." Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring). However,
white's opinion only evaluates the conduct of chronic alcoholics. Id. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Fortas acknowledges that the only issue in the case is whether one suffering from a
disease can be penalized for a condition which is a characteristic "part of the pattern of his disease
and due to a compulsion symptomatic of that disease." Id. at 559 n.2 (Fortas, J., dissenting). The
opinion states there is a distinction between the condition of being drunk in public and other
offenses which "require independent acts or conduct [where such acts] do not typically flow from
and are not part of the syndrome of the disease." Id.
67. Id. at 561 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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The Jones court did not deal with a compulsion stemming from
a disease, but rather conduct stemming from multiple causes, one of
which was homelessness." Homelessness may be considered, in
some circumstances, a situation caused by economic hardship,69 but
is certainly not a disease. Thus, an extension of the rationale used by
some of the Justices in Powell is not justified, as the situations
underlying the cases are not analogous. The Justices in Powell
vehemently disagreed as to whether conduct stemming from a
disease should be considered involuntary. The Jones majority should
have recognized the importance of the rift amongst the Powell court
and the tenuous link between a case about a disease and a case about
economic status. Had the Jones majority been more critical in its
analysis of Powell, it seems likely the court would have affirmed the
lower court's decision, thus allowing the Ordinance to remain in
effect throughout the day.
The Powell dissent seems to immunize from punishment
compulsive conduct caused by a disease. Consequently, extending
the Powell decision to conduct caused by economic hardship
presents a new set of dangers. The possible implications of the
Court's decision, with respect to economic status, are discussed
below in Section VI, subsection A. Relating to the issue specifically
delineated in the case, it must be noted that various Powell Justices
described the likely implications of immunizing from punishment
those who suffer from compulsions.
The Jones court should have heeded the warnings set forth by
the Powell plurality and in Justices Black and Harlan's concurrence,
concerning the limitless application that may flow from the dissent's
opinion.7" Justices Black and Harlan felt that if conduct derivative of
ones status is immunized from criminalization, states will not be able
to punish people whose conduct is the product of a "compulsion."'"
They suggested that sex offenders would not be punished if they
were able to show their actions were involuntary and a symptom of a
68. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
69. See National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, http://www.nlchp.org/
FAHAPIA/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (stating that the most common causes of homelessness
are: lack of affordable housing, lagging incomes and decreasing governmental assistance).
70. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 534 (Marshall, J., plurality); see also id. at 545 (Black & Harlan,
JJ., concurring).
71. Id. at 544 (Black & Harlan, JJ., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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disease.72 The plurality indicated that, under the dissent's rationale, a
person may not be punished for murder if that person "suffers from a
'compulsion' to kill."73 These examples indicate the policy concerns
regarding the potential broad readings that might stem from holding
a defendant's conduct involuntary. These fears seemed to be a major
consideration for four Justices in Powell. Hence, the same concerns
should have been considered when the court made its decision in
Jones. It seems that the majority in Jones ignored a key
consideration in Powell-namely, that holding conduct derivative of
status to be involuntary may open the flood gates to claims that a
person's criminal conduct was involuntary due to the situation they
were in at the time.
D. The Powell Dissent and
White's Concurrence Misinterpret Robinson
In Powell, the dissenters and Justice White based their
conclusion about conduct on their interpretation of Robinson,74 a case
which dealt with a situation where no conduct or act was involved.'5
This reliance on Robinson was a stretch as the court only addressed
criminalizing pure status, not conduct.76 The dissenters and Justice
White read a holding into Robinson that was not directly addressed
by the court in its decision. Once again, the Jones court should have
more closely analyzed the Powell dissent and White's concurrence
before placing such reliance on them.
The interpretation of Robinson that is supported by the facts in
the case is that criminal punishment can be imposed only if the
accused has committed an act. Robinson does not directly address
whether conduct cannot be constitutionally punished because it is
"involuntary."77 Here, the Appellants did commit an act: they slept
72. Id. at 545.
73. Id. at 534 (Marshall, J., plurality).
74. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
Powell, 392 U.S. at 548-54 ('White, J., concurring); id. at 565-68 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
75. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661-67 (1962).
76. Id.
77. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1143-44 (Rymer, J., dissenting); see also Note, The Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635, 650-53
(1966). The interpretation of Robinson that most courts have adopted is that of a pure status
theory. Id. at 650. Under this theory, "no law may criminally punish drug addiction unless
addiction is defined to require the commission of acts." Id.
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in public areas. As a result, Jones falls out of the purview of
Robinson's holding, which only applies to cases lacking an actus
reus.78 Thus, the court's reliance on Robinson was misplaced. This
diluted string of inferences and lack of critical analysis suggests that
the court simply decided its ends and did whatever it took to create a
viable means to reach it.
The court in Jones should have used judicial restraint and
recognized that it is a "rare type of case" that allows the Eighth
Amendment to place substantive limits on what conduct can be made
criminal.79 If courts do not respect the limits set forth in Robinson,
they will become "the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal
responsibility,"8 and states will not be able punish actions that result
from something "involuntary," such as a compulsion." Further, the
decision in Jones is the perfect example of the dangers that stem
from a decision that "involuntary" conduct cannot be punished, when
"involuntary" is not defined.
E. The Jones Court Ignored the Holding in Joyce
The majority in Jones concluded that being homeless is a status,
rather than a condition. 2 This was a key element of its argument that
involuntary conduct derivative of status is constitutionally protected
under the Eighth Amendment. In so holding, the majority in Jones
ignored the precedent set in a U.S. District Court Case, Joyce v. City
and County of San Francisco.3  While Joyce is classified as
persuasive authority, the similarities between its facts and those of
the Jones case heighten Joyce's relevance.
The Joyce court dealt with the constitutionality of a law
enforcement plan called the "Matrix Program," which directed its
78. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660-67. It is also interesting to note that courts have followed
this interpretation, as advocated by the Powell plurality. See, e.g., United States v. Parga-Rosas,
238 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the point of Powell and Ayala is that criminal
penalties can be imposed only if the accused "has committed some actus reus"); United States v.
Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Powell, 392 U.S. at 533 (Marshall, J., plurality)).
79. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138 (Rymer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Powell, 392 U.S. at 533 (Marshall, J., plurality).
81. Id. at 544 (Black & Harlan, JJ., concurring).
82. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1131 (noting that the district court erred in not conducting a more
thorough analysis of Robinson and Powell when it held that "homelessness is not a
constitutionally cognizable status").
83. 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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efforts at ending street crime.84 One aspect of the plan targeted
sleeping in parks and prohibited putting up tents in public parks.85
The court in Jones ignored the standard set forth in Joyce for a
variety of unsupported reasons. The Jones court distinguished itself
from Joyce because the plaintiffs in Joyce "did not make the strong
evidentiary showing of a substantial shortage of shelter" that the
Appellants made in Jones.86  This distinction, however, is unsub-
stantiated as evidence suggested that the Appellants in Jones also did
not prove a lack of shelter on the nights in question.87 The Jones
majority also claimed that the Joyce court did not enjoin enforcement
of certain statutes against the homeless, including a statute which
prohibited sleeping in public areas, because the injunction sought
was too broad. The Jones majority thus claimed Joyce was "based
on a very different factual underpinning."88
In reality, the Jones court focused on insignificant details to
distinguish the cases and in doing so, completely ignored the strong
similarities between the cases, including similar policy concerns.
Both cases dealt with the issue of whether homelessness and sleeping
on the streets can be considered involuntary conduct and the Eighth
Amendment implications that flow from such a determination.89
Like the court in Jones, the court in Joyce analyzed whether
homelessness could be considered a status and determined that
homelessness was not a status, but rather a condition.9"
The holding in Joyce that homelessness is not a status, as "status
cannot be defined as a function of the discretionary acts of others,"'"
should have played a role in deciding Jones, as the cases are in many
ways analogous. This is supported by the fact that the Supreme
Court has held that there is no constitutional right to shelter meeting
84. Id. at 845-46.
85. Id. at 846.
86. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1131-32.
87. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
88. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1131.
89. See id. at 1131-38; Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 853-58.
90. Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 857-58.
91. See id. at 857. Examples of status characteristics are: age, race, gender, national origin,
and illness. Id. The court also notes that there is a difference between drug addiction and
homelessness: "To argue that homelessness is a status and not a condition . . . is to deny the
efficacy of acts of social intervention to change the condition of those currently homeless." Id.
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certain standards.9 2 "Being homeless ... is a transitory state. Some
people fall into it, others opt into it."93 Classification as homeless
changes on "a daily basis and can change depending upon income
and opportunities for shelter. 9 4 No court has held that status (i.e.,
being homeless under the Jones decision) plus a condition (i.e., being
without shelter) which subsists because of another's discretionary
action, such as Los Angeles' failure to provide enough shelter, is an
involuntary condition protected from penalization.95 It seems that the
Jones court reached an unsupported conclusion that the two cases
presented very different factual situations, in order to avoid applying
the Joyce holding to its case.
By not holding the homeless responsible for their conduct, the
court effectively immunizes people from liability when they commit
an act that results from a condition caused by the government's
failure to provide a benefit.96 Making a person immune from liability
based on lack of aid by another may open the door to a variety of
crimes that states will no longer be able to punish.
F. The Jones Court Did Not Make a Sufficient Showing
That Shelter Was Unavailable on the Nights in Question
Additionally, the majority in Jones claimed that the failure to
supply beds caused the prohibited act, but there was no showing that
shelter was unavailable on those nights.97 For example, with regard
to Appellant, Robert Lee Purrie, there was no evidence presented
which tended to show he was turned away from a shelter.98
Appellant, Edward Jones, chose not to sleep in a shelter because the
shelters segregate men and women, and his wife suffers from severe
emotional distress when they are separated.99 Appellants, Patricia
and George Vinson, slept on the street on the night they were cited
because they missed the bus to the shelter.' °° The dissent's view is
92. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
93. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1146 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 1139.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 1140.
99. See Appellees' Brief, supra note 14, at 5.
100. See id. at 6.
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supported by Jan Perry, a councilwoman representing the Ninth
District, who insists that "no one is arrested by the LAPD before
being offered a bed for the night at a local shelter."'' In reality, the
Ordinance has been used very sparingly1°2 and has exposed criminal
activities that would not have been discovered without the ability to
enforce the Ordinance. 3 This discrepancy in the court's reasoning,
in conjunction with the various articles describing how the
Ordinance is actually being used on the streets, illustrates that the
City's ability to provide stability by reducing crime in areas like Skid
Row is contingent on having the resources necessary to effectuate
plans of enforcement.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. The Legal Ramifications of Jones
Jones presents just the kind of situation where limits need to be
placed on conduct. Allowing scores of people to sleep in public
areas creates a serious threat to public health and safety. The
legalized encampments that have resulted from the court's decision
have made the area more dangerous." 4 These tents now offer
"private office space for dealers and pimps, and the police will be
powerless to intervene."'0 5 In order to provide safety within home-
less communities and predictability to the courts, the court in Jones
should have construed the "substantive limits" effect of the Eighth
Amendment narrowly, as has been suggested by other courts.0 6
The precedent set by Jones houses a variety of legal
ramifications. Other cases have identified the possible impact of a
decision similar to Jones. In Joyce, the court recognized the uncer-
101. Perry, supra note 1, at B1l.
102. See Richard Winton & Patrick McGreevy, Appeal of Skid Row Ruling is Urged, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2006, at B4. According to the City's Police Chief William J. Bratton, the no
sleeping ordinance has only led to fifty eight arrests this year and "[t]he idea we [the LAPD] are
somehow arresting dozens of people every day is garbage." Id.
103. Id. Police Chief Bratton told the commission that the ability to arrest people for sleeping
on the streets is a "very effective tool." Id. Additionally, Captain Andy Smith, commander of the
downtown area, said that the Ordinance is used for probable cause to question people. Id. This
practice "has led to the discovery of other crimes." Id.
104. Brady Westwater, Handing Skid Row to the Drug Dealers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006,
at B15.
105. Id.
106. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977).
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tainty that would result in upholding the plaintiffs claim that a
statute should be invalid because it targets "life-sustaining activities
such as sleeping, sitting or remaining in a public place."'' 7 The court
stressed that such a determination would cause governments to be
left blind as to what conduct would then be immunized from
government regulation."8 The court worried that other conduct such
as "urinating and defecating in public and aggressive panhandling"
could be considered "life sustaining activities." ' 9  This decision
involves a dangerously broad reading of Jones and opens the
floodgates as to what constitutes "involuntary" conduct.
If the Jones decision is read to require housing for the entire
homeless population of Los Angeles and panhandling is one day
considered "life sustaining" but prohibited by statute, the City may
be required to provide sufficient food and money to all homeless
individuals. Such a decision would certainly not bring Los Angeles
any closer to ending homelessness altogether, which one can only
hope is the ultimate goal.
B. Jones's Impact in Los Angeles
The constitutional basis for the decision in Jones is, at a
minimum, shaky. However, it spreads an important message to Los
Angeles and its varied communities-namely, that homelessness is a
problem that Los Angeles and the nation can no longer ignore. The
court's decision broadened the scope of the Eighth Amendment, and
at the same time, stymied law enforcement from fighting crime and
blight on Skid Row. Since the court's decision in April, the Los
Angeles Police Department's ("LAPD") count of homeless individ-
uals living on the streets of Skid Row has skyrocketed, and the
number of tents present on Skid Row has become stifling."0
107. Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 851 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(quoting Plaintiffs' Proposed Order Granting Mot. for Prel. Inj., Joyce v. City and County of San
Francisco, No. C-93-4149 (N.D. Cal. 1994)).
108. See id. at 851.
109. Id.; cf Glasheen v. City of Austin, 840 F. Supp. 62 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (upholding city
ordinance designed to reduce aggressive panhandling); Young v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 903
F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990) (reversing lower court injunction enjoining the defendant from
prohibiting panhandling)).
110. Winton, supra note 2. Before the Jones decision, the LAPD count found there to be
1345 homeless individuals living on Skid Row and 187 tents. Id. On July 25, 2006 the number
of homeless individuals living on Skid Row rose to 1527, and 539 tents were counted. Then, on
September 18, 2006 the count rose again to 1876 homeless people and 518 tents. Id.
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Additionally, drug dealing and violent crime in communities
near Skid Row has "explode[d]" since the April decision."' So,
while the ACLU's suit was undoubtedly filed with the noble
intention of helping the situation of the Los Angeles homeless
community, it seems that the decision has had the opposite effect.
The court's decision only reinforces the notion that Los
Angeles's Skid Row is the dumping ground for the region's
homeless." 2 The number of homeless on Skid Row is multiplying,
and Los Angeles is left without a means to do anything about it. The
decision in Jones was undoubtedly reached with the goal of
immediately bettering the situation for homeless individuals in Los
Angeles. The long term goal, however, which should be to end
homelessness and keep the City's homeless population as safe as
possible, is certainly not advanced by this decision."3
Unable to crack down on the homelessness and drug problem on
Skid Row, the City Police Chief, William Bratton, and the Mayor of
Los Angeles, Antonio Villaraigosa, have been pushing for a
settlement with the ACLU."' In late September, the Los Angeles
City Council voted ten to three, in a closed session, to reject the
proposed settlement."5 The settlement would have allowed the
homeless to sleep on the streets of Skid Row from 9:00 p.m. until
6:00 a.m."6 It is unfortunate that the city of Los Angeles will
continue to spend limited funds on a legal defense rather than putting
that money toward social projects to combat homelessness.
Additionally, the settlement exposed yet another possible
consequence of the Ninth Circuit's decision. One of the reasons that
111. Westwater, supra note 104 (statement made by Brady Westwater, a neighborhood
council activist and writer for www.citywatchla.com).
112. Perry, supra note 1. Two thirds of the cities in the Los Angeles region do not even allow
shelters, which is a violation of state law. "The ... decision will only reinforce the view of law
enforcement authorities and mental health officials from outside Los Angeles that public drunks,
drug users, homeless people and those suffering from mental illness belong not in their city, but
in downtown L.A." Id.
113. See Westwater, supra note 104 ("Legalizing encampments will only make it harder to
get the homeless off the streets, while making their lives more dangerous. During the police-free
hours every night, the tents will offer private office space for dealers and pimps, and the police
will be powerless to intervene. During the day, these tents will be folded up and leaned against a
fence until the clock strikes 9 p.m.").
114. See id.; see also Steve Hymon & Richard Winton, Attempt to Settle Skid Row Suit Fails,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at Al.
115. Hymon & Winton, supra note 114.
116. Id.
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the Council denied the settlement was due to fear that the ACLU
would make similar arguments for other parts of the City, "setting a
precedent that could result in people sleeping on sidewalks in
Hollywood, Venice and elsewhere."'' 7 Such a settlement would
likely continue to draw homeless individuals from other communities
in the region to Los Angeles, which may further paralyze the City's
fight against homelessness."'
Though the ACLU and the city of Los Angeles have very
different takes on the proper path to end homelessness, especially
with regard to short term efforts, it is safe to say that both sides want
to see homelessness come to an end. Ending homelessness is a goal
on which this comment does not purport to hypothesize. However, it
seems that both the ACLU and the city of Los Angeles, by choice or
not, have focused their energy on plans that do not bring such goals
into view. While putting the homeless in jail for sleeping on the
streets is certainly not the answer, using shoddy constitutional
reasoning to block an ordinance that gives law enforcement officers
"tools to work with,"" 9 is not the answer either.
VI. CONCLUSION
Los Angeles cannot be expected to house the region's entire
homeless population, which exceeds 80,000 people. 20 The entire
region needs to work together.'2' "[E]fforts to improve the district
have focused too narrowly on public safety and policing, rather than
including issues such as housing, supportive services and moving
homeless services out of downtown."' 22  Homelessness has not
117. Id.; see also Westwater, supra note 104 ("Keeping this bad decision on the books opens
up the likelihood that someone will use the same legal reasoning to erect tent cities on the
sidewalks of Venice, Hollywood or anywhere else a homeless 'advocate' can complain about
insufficient shelter beds."). The article also notes the danger in locking the city into a "process
that will create permanently protected havens for drug dealers. We can't let the ACLU forcibly
privatize public sidewalks for anyone who wishes to live on them." Westwater, supra note 104;
see also Winton, supra note 2 ("'Any settlement that leaves people living on the street in filthy
conditions and permits chaos from 9 to 6 every night in one critical area of the city is
unacceptable,' said Carol Schatz, president and chief executive of the Central City Assn.").
118. See Hymon & Winton, supra note 114.
119. Cara Mia DiMassa & Richard Winton, Key Moment for Skid Row's Future, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2006, at B1.
120. See Perry, supra note 1.
121. See id.
122. DiMassa & Winton, supra note 119.
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always been the pervasive social problem that it is today. The
government, with the help of organizations, such as the ACLU, and
cities, such as Los Angeles, can help undo the crisis. Creating more
low income housing, treatment on demand for substance abuse and
mental illness, and providing a living wage for workers would be a
start. '23
On the other hand, this case and its controversial decision may
have brought to the problem of homelessness a sense of urgency that
was not present before. Police Chief Bratton is considering a plan
that would crack down on the lawlessness present on Skid Row by
"flooding downtown with police officers and surveillance cameras
and establishing a zero-tolerance mind-set."'24 These are hopeful
signs that the city is changing and reworking its policies. One can
only hope that this momentum does not fade with the lengthy appeals
process that seems inevitable.'25
123. See Editorial, Homeless and Sleepless, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 24, 2006, at A10.
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